The U.S. Justice Department yesterday released the information below:
SAN
DIEGO – Jinchao Wei, a former U.S. Navy sailor who was convicted of espionage
by a federal jury in August 2025, was sentenced in federal court today to 200
months in prison.
Wei, 25, also known as Patrick Wei, was arrested in August 2023
on espionage charges as he arrived for work on the amphibious assault ship
U.S.S. Essex at Naval Base San Diego, the homeport of the Pacific Fleet. He was
indicted by a federal grand jury, accused of selling national defense
information to an intelligence officer working for the People’s Republic of
China for $12,000.
Following a five-day trial and one day of deliberation, the jury
convicted Wei of six crimes, including conspiracy to commit espionage,
espionage, and unlawful export of, and conspiracy to export, technical data
related to defense articles in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations. He was found not guilty of one count
of naturalization fraud.
“Members of the United States military swear to support and
defend the Constitution of the United States,” said Deputy Attorney General
Todd Blanche. “This active-duty U.S. Navy sailor betrayed his country and
compromised the national security of the United States. The Justice Department
will not tolerate this behavior. We stand ready to investigate, defend, and
protect the interests of the American people.”
“Wei swore loyalty to the United States when he joined the Navy
and reaffirmed that oath when he became a citizen,” said Assistant Attorney
General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. “He then accepted the solemn
responsibility of protecting this Nation’s secrets when the United States
entrusted him with sensitive Navy information. He made a mockery of these
commitments when he chose to endanger our Nation and our servicemembers by
selling U.S. military secrets to a Chinese intelligence officer for personal
profit. Today’s sentence reflects our commitment to ensuring those who sell our
Nation’s secrets pay a very high price for their betrayal.”
“He
betrayed his oath, his shipmates, the United States Navy, and the American
people — a level of disloyalty that strikes at the heart of our national
security and demanded this powerful sentence,” said U.S. Attorney Adam Gordon.
“By sharing thousands of documents, operating manuals, and
export-controlled and sensitive information with a Chinese intelligence
officer, Petty Officer Wei knowingly betrayed his fellow service members and
the American people,” said NCIS Director Omar Lopez. “Today’s outcome
demonstrates the shared commitment of NCIS, FBI, the Department of Justice and
our Intelligence partners to aggressively pursue and hold accountable those who
would put the lethality and readiness of our Naval fleet, as well as our national
security, at risk. NCIS remains steadfast in its mission to protect U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps forces and warfighting capabilities by neutralizing
counterintelligence threats ashore, afloat and in cyberspace.”
“Today’s sentence marks the conclusion of a first-of-its-kind
espionage investigation in the district and reflects the seriousness of Wei’s
egregious actions against his own country,” said Special Agent in Charge Mark
Dargis, of the FBI San Diego Field Office. “The FBI will aggressively defend
our homeland from anyone threatening our national security, including those on
the inside betraying their sworn duty to the United States. We remain steadfast
in protecting the American people and will continue to work with all our law
enforcement partners to successfully carry out this mission.”
According to evidence presented at trial, Wei, in his role as a
machinist’s mate, held a U.S. security clearance and had access to sensitive
national defense information about the ship’s weapons, propulsion and
desalination systems. Amphibious assault ships like the Essex resemble small
aircraft carriers and allow the U.S. military to project power and maintain
presence by serving as the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious readiness
and expeditionary strike capabilities.
On February 14, 2022, Wei was recruited by a Chinese
intelligence officer via social media who at first portrayed himself as a naval
enthusiast who worked for the state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation. The evidence showed that even during the early days of his
espionage career, Wei strongly suspected the intelligence officer’s true
identity and motive.
On February 22, 2022, Wei told a friend who was also in the U.S.
Navy that he thought he was “on the radar of a China intelligence
organization,” as he was in contact with an individual who was “extremely
suspicious,” “interested in the maintenance cycle of naval ships,” and wanted
him to “walk the pier” to “see which ships are docked” on a “daily basis.” Wei
said that this person would pay him $500. Wei told his friend that he is “no
idiot” and that “this is quite obviously fucking espionage.”
Wei’s friend suggested that Wei delete the contact. Instead of
heeding his friend’s advice, the next day Wei transitioned his communications
with the intelligence officer to a different encrypted messaging application
that he believed was more secure and began spying for the intelligence officer.
The evidence showed that between March 2022 and when he was
arrested in August 2023, Wei, at the request of the intelligence officer, sent
photographs and videos of the Essex, advised the officer of the location of
various Navy ships, and described the defensive weapons of the Essex. He also
described problems with his ship and other ships based at Naval Base San Diego
and elsewhere. And, he sent the intelligence officer thousands of pages of
technical and operational information about U.S. Navy surface warfare ships
like the Essex that he took from restricted U.S. Navy computer systems.
In exchange for this information, the officer paid Wei more than
$12,000 over 18 months. In one of his larger thefts of U.S. Navy data, Wei sold
the intelligence officer at least 30 technical and operating manuals about U.S.
Navy systems. These manuals contained export control warnings and detailed the
operations of multiple systems aboard the Essex and similar ships, including
power, steering, weapons control, aircraft and deck elevators, as well as
damage and casualty controls. In total, Wei sold the intelligence officer
approximately 60 technical and operating manuals about U.S. Navy ships, as well
as dozens of photographs and papers about the U.S. Navy and Wei’s assignments
on the Essex. Many of the manuals contained conspicuous export-control warnings
on their cover pages.
During the trial, the government presented evidence
including phone conversations, electronic messages, and audio messages
that Wei exchanged with his Chinese handler. These messages showed how they
communicated, what they spoke about, the need for secrecy, the efforts they
made to cover their tracks, the tasks issued by his case handler, and how Wei
was paid for his work via an online payment method.
As their relationship developed, Wei called his handler “Big
Brother Andy” and obliged requests to keep their relationship secret by using
multiple encrypted apps; deleting messages and accounts; using digital “dead
drops” that disappear in 72 hours; and using a new computer and phone provided
by his handler.
The government told the jury that the evidence showed Wei was
aware that what he was doing was wrong. He had received recent training from
the Navy regarding how to detect recruitment efforts from foreign governments;
he attempted to conceal his activity; and he searched the internet about
another case in which a U.S. Navy sailor was convicted of espionage, even
reading a Department of Justice press release about that case.
Much of the evidence showed the evolution of Wei’s relationship
with his handler - Wei’s increasing willingness to collect more and more
sensitive information, and the intelligence officer’s employment of
intelligence tradecraft to keep developing Wei as a spy and to conceal their
relationship and activities from U.S. authorities. For example, the jury saw
photographs of the hand-written receipts that Wei created and sent to his
handler to be paid and conversations that Wei and his handler had regarding the
handler’s increasingly generous offers to Wei, such as a trip for Wei and his
mother to travel to China. Moreover, the jury was presented with documents and
records obtained from electronic accounts demonstrating the intelligence
officer’s identity as a PRC intelligence officer, including photographs and
identification documents.
During his post-arrest interview Wei admitted that he gave the
intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operating manuals and
export-controlled data about U.S. Navy surface warfare ships, and that the
intelligence officer paid him thousands of dollars for these materials. He also
admitted that he knew that his actions were wrong and that he had tried to hide
his activities. When the interviewing agents asked Wei how he would describe
what he had been doing with the intelligence officer, Wei responded,
“espionage.”
Wei, during his post-arrest interview with FBI: “I’m screwed.”
FBI: “What makes you say that?”
Wei: “That I’m sharing the unclassified document to—I
mean document with, uhm, him . . . I’m not supposed to do that.”
The crime of espionage under U.S. Code Section 794 has never
been charged in this district. The statute is reserved for the most serious
circumstances involving the passage of national defense information intended to
harm the United States or for the benefit of a foreign power.
This case was investigated by the FBI and the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service and is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney John
Parmley from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California
and Adam Barry, former Trial Attorney from the National Security Division’s
Counterintelligence and Export Control Section who is currently Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Columbia.
The U.S. Department of State, the Transportation Security
Administration and Homeland Security Investigations provided valuable
assistance.
DEFENDANT Case
Number
23CR01471-H
Jinchao
Wei
Age:
25
San Diego
SUMMARY OF CHARGES
Conspiracy to Commit Espionage – Title 18, United States Code,
Section 794(c)
Maximum Penalty: Life in prison, $250,000 fine
Count 1 - GUILTY
Espionage – Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 794(a)
Maximum Penalty: Life in prison and $250,000
Count 2 - GUILTY
Conspiracy to Export Defense Articles without a License -- Title
22, U.S.C., Sec. 2778(b)(2) and (c) and Title 22, C.F.R., Secs. 121.1, 127.1
and 127.3
Maximum Penalty: Twenty years in prison and $1 million fine
Count 3 - GUILTY
Exporting Defense Articles without a License -- Title 22,
U.S.C., Sec. 2778(b)(2) and (c) and
Title 22, C.F.R., Secs. 121.1, 127.1 and 127.3
Maximum Penalty: Twenty years in prison and $1 million fine
Counts 4, 5 and 6 - GUILTY
Naturalization Fraud – Title 18, United States Code, Section
1425 (a)
Maximum Penalty: Ten years in prison, $250,000 fine, and order
of denaturalization
Count 7 – NOT GUILTY
INVESTIGATING AGENCIES
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
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