By Ken White
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
SPRINGFIELD, Va., Oct. 18, 2012 - Fifty years after they discovered Soviet
missiles poised to strike the United States from Cuba, two intelligence officers
met with hundreds of their current-day counterparts to commemorate the
anniversary of the crisis that nearly brought the world to nuclear war.
Dino
Brugioni and Vincent DiRenzo were part of a small group from the CIA's National
Photographic Interpretation Center who worked for 13 tense days in October 1962
to avert disaster. They joined author and journalist Michael Dobbs, and two
current analysts, in an Oct. 15 panel discussion at the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency here.
Through reminiscences and present-day observations, the group illustrated the
significance of the crisis and its continued impact on the tradecraft of imagery
and geospatial analysis.
A photo interpreter, DiRenzo led the NPIC team and formed the initial
conclusion about the presence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba
from analysis of U-2 spy plane imagery. He discussed the immediate wake of his
discovery.
"Considering the severity of the identification, we figured we'd be in for a
long night," DiRenzo said. He indicated that the initial assessment was not a
"slam dunk," as convincing people of the true significance of the find was
difficult. While DiRenzo was absolutely sure, the image did not show clearly
identifiable missiles, but rather, long, canvas-covered objects that, to the
layman, could be almost anything.
Charged with preparing materials on daily developments for NPIC Director
Arthur C. Lundahl's briefs to the executive committee and the White House,
Brugioni was instrumental in arming President John F. Kennedy with intelligence
needed to navigate this perilous moment in history.
He recalled with humor how many of his briefing boards came back from the
White House marked up with blue crayon from a doodling Caroline Kennedy. On a
more somber note, he also relayed the fearful mood of the time.
"Black Saturday, we had gone to [defense readiness condition] 2," Brugioni
said. "Fourteen hundred bombers were loaded with nuclear weapons; 50 B-52s were
in the air; eight Polaris submarines were at sea; 125 [intercontinental
ballistic missiles] were ready to fire; there was tactical aviation; there was
60 Thor missiles in England, 30 Jupiter missiles in Italy, and 15 Jupiters in
Turkey. That morning we met with Art Lundahl and told him that all 24 pads were
operational, meaning that within four to six hours, 24 missiles could be coming
at the United States.
"I remember Lundahl scratching his chin, looked at me and said, 'I don't want
to scare the hell out of them, but I want to make sure they understand the
danger,'" Brugioni recalled.
The son of a career diplomat, Dobbs spent his formative years behind the Iron
Curtain. He became a Cold War scholar after covering it as a foreign
correspondent for the Washington Post. He drew a parallel between his work and
intelligence analysis.
"I feel a kinship with intelligence analysts. We try to start with the
evidence and proceed from the evidence to the conclusions," Dobbs said. "Our
goal is to tell truth to power."
Dobbs went on to laud the efforts of the team who identified the missiles,
and to praise Brugioni for his efforts since the crisis to improve public
understanding of photo analysis.
"Dino has done more than anyone else to explain the art and science of photo
interpretation to the broader public," he said. "He's a great educator; he's
very good at explaining very complicated matters to laymen."
He also discussed how his research of the crisis, with the advantage of 50
years of hindsight, affirmed both the significance the crisis and the
criticality of intelligence to policymaking. He also pointed out that 60 to 70
percent of the actionable intelligence came from NPIC during the
crisis.
"This was the moment of the photo interpreter," Dobbs said. "They
were able to tell [the president] when the missiles would be ready to fire."
It was probably the single biggest intelligence coup of the Cold War, he
added.
Art Lundahl's son, Robert, shared his late father's connection with the
president.
"Above all, my father was certainly a technologist. He was a scientist at
heart; he loved technology," said the younger Lundahl. "It sounded like
President Kennedy had an equal interest in technology. There was a bond
there."
Beyond technology, Lundahl also shared what he believes to be the key to his
father's effectiveness as an intelligence officer: exceptional communication
skills.
"He was born to brief," Lundahl said. Specifically, he noted his father's
ability to be credible, while adjusting to the knowledge level of his audience
and using humor to diffuse tension.
NGA analyst Walter S. Trynock compared and contrasted the world of 1962 with
today's environment. Communication skills remain critical for analysts, he
noted, but the tools for providing geospatial intelligence are markedly
different, and today's leaders are bombarded with information.
"The type of information, and the pace in which information is received by
the policymaker, is constant, at all times of the day and night," Trynock said.
"So the challenge is to bring out the relevancy and the 'so what' to contribute
to their decision making."
Then and now, keen analysis always has been key, Dobbs said.
"Intelligence is like a huge jigsaw puzzle, and you only find a few pieces,
and there are always going to be some missing pieces, but from the pieces you do
find, you try to inform policymakers about the entire jigsaw puzzle," he
said.
