Saturday, August 15, 2026

A Look Back At The 30 Assault Unit, The British WWII Commando Group Created By Royal Navy Commander Ian Fleming, The Creator Of James Bond

Back in 2011 Counterterrorism magazine ran my piece on Ian Fleming and the British commando group he created in World War II.

Before he sat down at his desk at his Jamaican villa Goldeneye in 1952 and wrote the classic James Bond thrillers, Ian Fleming served as a Royal Navy intelligence officer during World War II.

Commander Fleming served as the personal assistant to the Director of British Royal Naval Intelligence and one of Fleming's accomplishments during the war was the creation of a naval intelligence-commando group called the 30 Assault Unit. 

You can read my piece above and below:

  

Note: You can click on the above to enlarge. 

Thursday, August 13, 2026

My Philly Daily On Crime Column: Philly Needs More Cops

 Philly Daily ran my On Crime column on why Philadelphia needs more cops.

You can read the column via the link below or the following text:

Paul Davis: Philly needs more cops – Philly Daily


Back in June NBC10 questioned whether Philadelphia had enough police officers to cover the summer’s FIFA World Cup matches in Philadelphia, as well as the 250th Anniversary of the Signing of the Declaration of Independence celebration.

As NBC10 noted, the city budget called for 6,380 sworn officers, according to a department spokesperson. As of the end of April, there were about 5,300 sworn officers and recruits in training.

“That gap represents a vacancy rate of more than 18%,” Police Commissioner Kevin Bethel said. “The department is working to close it, though progress has been gradual.”

“Yes, staffing is down, but we were on an upward trajectory,” Bethel added. “It’s not moving as fast as folks would hope. Our main concern is our officers not getting burned out – not working to the point where the job becomes unattractive to them because they feel like they're being forced to work, they don't have time for family, they can't take a vacation.

“I think part of my journey was to make sure that the men and women feel valued in this police department,” Bethel said. “It’s one thing to work overtime because you have to, it's, another thing to work overtime because you believe in the mission, you believe the spirit of core.” 

I reached out to retired Philadelphia police sergeant Gary Capuno (seen in the above photo) and asked him why he thinks the city needs more cops. 

"The City of Philadelphia needs more police officers. The lack of manpower does not just endanger the community - it endangers the officers who are still out there trying to do the job, “Capuano replied. 

“There doesn't seem to be the same level of concern about the safety implications of having critically low numbers of officers patrolling our neighborhoods. Stand outside almost any police district during a change of shift and see how many officers hit the street. When I last worked the street in 2016, we were lucky at times to have three or four officers working a tour.” 

Capuano said that the manpower problem didn't happen overnight. 

“When I started in the 4th District, headquartered at 11th and Wharton Streets, the district was divided into 13 sectors. Sectors required manpower. In 2009, the department moved to Police Service Areas (PSAs) and did away with the traditional sector system. Many districts were then divided into only three or four PSAs.

In 2010, the 4th District was absorbed into the 3rd District, creating an even larger geographic area for officers to cover. By 2015, when I was promoted to sergeant, we were at least 150 officers short in that district alone.” 

Capuano said this shortage has real-world consequences. 

“If manpower is truly the reason an arrest cannot be properly processed, releasing the prisoner does absolutely nothing to solve the manpower problem. It simply masks it. More importantly, directing officers to release prisoners because there are not enough personnel available to handle an arrest can create the appearance that everything is functioning normally when clearly it is not. If supervisors continually work around staffing shortages rather than allowing the consequences of inadequate manpower to be documented and addressed, they risk becoming complicit in concealing the seriousness of the problem.” 

Capuano said that one cannot demonstrate the need for additional personnel while simultaneously taking steps that prevent the shortage from being reflected in the actual workload. 

“At some point, Philadelphia's manpower problem needs to be acknowledged rather than managed in ways that make it less visible. When I was a sergeant, I tried to do what little I could to bring attention to the problem and get additional personnel for my district. I made phone calls. I sent emails to the FOP. And I still have the receipts. It may not have been much, but it was more than simply accepting the situation as normal. 

Capuano said that this issue is personal to him. 

“I believe inadequate manpower played a role in the circumstances that led to the injury that ultimately ended my police career. As a sergeant, I knew my officers were working the street with limited backup. I had a responsibility not only to supervise them, but to back them up on priority jobs when they needed help.

When you know you have only a handful of officers working, you don't have the luxury of sitting back and saying, "I'm the supervisor." When they need help, you go. 

“That meant I wasn't simply supervising from a distance. I was responding to priority jobs, backing up my officers and putting myself into situations where, with adequate staffing, additional patrol officers might otherwise have been available. In my opinion, the manpower shortage placed additional demands on me as a supervisor and contributed to the circumstances surrounding the injury that eventually ended my career.”

Low manpower isn't merely a number on a staffing report, Capuano explained. 

“It has real consequences for the men and women working the street. It means fewer officers available for backup, supervisors taking on additional operational responsibilities, officers working longer hours and losing days off, and everyone being asked to do more with less.

So how do we begin fixing it?

“The city needs to seriously reconsider what it offers prospective police officers. I believe one of the most effective recruiting tools would be a significantly improved retirement package. Offer officers a meaningful 20-year retirement with lifetime benefits, and I believe you would see a substantial increase in applicants willing to make policing a career. The department should also explore schedules such as four 10-hour workdays. A schedule that provides officers with more regular weekends and meaningful time with their families could improve recruiting, retention, morale and quality of life.

You cannot continually ask fewer officers to do more, work longer hours, lose days off, handle larger geographic areas and carry an ever-increasing workload without consequences.

Low manpower also affects response times.

“It affects proactive policing. It affects morale. It affects officer safety. And ultimately, it affects public safety.

Philadelphia needs more police officers—and no amount of creative staffing, statistical maneuvering or working around the shortage can substitute for putting enough cops back on the street."

Paul Davis’s On Crime column appears here each week. He also a contributor to Broad + Liberty and Counterterrorism magazine.


My South Philly Review Crime Beat Column: Philadelphia Police SafeCam: Private Cameras For Public Safety

 The South Philly Review published Crime Beat column yesterday. 

You can read the column via the page above or the text below:


I recall visiting the Philadelphia Police Homicide Division when it was housed in the old “Roundhouse” police headquarters some years ago. 

The old building at 8th and Race Steets was called the Roundhouse due its circular structure, which has been said to resemble a pair of handcuffs when seen from the sky. 

Homicide detectives are considered the top-of-the-line investigators. I spoke to then-Lt. Mark Deegan in the crowded homicide division office, and he explained to me that the first thing homicide detectives do at a murder scene is look for residential and business cameras. Often the footage on the cameras aids the investigation by identifying the murderer. 

Deegan stated that it was hard to get witnesses to a murder, as they often fear retaliation from armed and dangerous criminals, so cameras play an important role in homicide investigations. 

“Cameras are the detectives’ eyes on the street,” Deegan said. 

Cameras played an important role in identifying the two suspects in the recent murder of Billy Schmidt in South Philly. 

Cameras also aid the police in lesser crimes such as theft from autos and vandalism. Although these and other lesser crimes are far less serious than murder, these quality-of-life crimes infuriate residents.   

Which brings me to the Philadelphia Police Department’s SafeCam Program. 

“SafeCam is one of the Philadelphia Police Department's contemporary crime prevention and investigation tools that demonstrate the effectiveness of partnerships between police and the community,” the Philadelphia Police state on their website. “Registering your camera not only helps deter crime but assists the Department in its overall crime prevention strategy in your neighborhood. Protect yourself, your family and your community by registering with SafeCam.”

According to the Philadelphia Police registration is simple and only takes about 10 minutes to complete.

 

“You will provide basic information and tell us where your cameras are located. There is no cost associated with registration and your information is confidential. You may delete your registration at any time. After registering, you will receive a confirmation email at the address you provided. This email serves as proof of your registration and can be printed or forwarded as needed. Keep it for your records in case you need to reference your registration in the future. You will only be contacted by the Philadelphia Police Department in the future if there is a criminal incident in the vicinity of your security camera. Police personnel, if necessary, may request a copy of any video captured by your camera, which may assist in the investigation of a crime.”

 

You can register via the link below:

 

Safecam Registration | Philadelphia Police Department (PPD)

 

The Philadelphia Police state that the goal of the SafeCam program is to deter crime and promote public safety through partnerships and collaboration between the Philadelphia Police Department and the communities they serve. SafeCam helps the police identify potential cameras in the community that could help with an investigation if a crime or incident occurs in the vicinity. SafeCam is strictly a registration program.

By registering your cameras, you agree to the following terms and conditions: 

1.     Philadelphia Police Department may contact you directly, using the information you have provided, to request appropriate surveillance footage as it relates to a crime or incident that may have occurred near your property. 

2.     Any footage containing or related to criminal activity may be collected by the Philadelphia Police Department for use in an investigation or as evidence during any stage of a criminal proceeding. 

3.     Relevant information is reserved for official use by the Philadelphia Police Department and will not be released to any member of the general public or to the media. 

 

I spoke to a South Philly resident who has enrolled in the SafeCam Program.

 

“I installed a camera on my house for security and protection,” the man told me. “But if my camera captures a crime away from my property, then I believe it is my civic duty to help the police and my neighbors. So, I allow the police to have access to my camera for any crime that may happen near me.”

 

Paul Davis’s Crime Beat column appears here each week. He can be reached via pauldavisoncrime.com. 

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

On This Day In History Ian Fleming, Former WWII British Naval Intelligence Officer, Journalist And Author Of The James Bond Thrillers, Died

On this date in 1964 Ian Fleming, former WWII naval intelligence officer, journalist and author of the James Bond thrillers, died. He was 56.

I became an Ian Fleming aficionado when I was a pre-teen in the early 1960s after watching the late, great Scot actor Sean Connery portray Ian Fleming’s iconic character James Bond in the first two Bond films, Dr. No and From Russia With Love.

Watching the two great cinematic thrillers led me to join a book club and receive the introductory offer of a 9-volumn set of Ian Fleming's novels, which were the first nine books in my now quite extensive library.. 

Reading the first two Fleming novels, I was pleased to discover that the novels were darker and more complicated that the films.  

A short time later, I heard on the radio in my father's car that Ian Fleming had died.   

At the time I was already dreaming of becoming a writer. And I was influenced hughly by Ian Fleming's James Bond novels. I loved Ian Fleming's use of exotic locals, nasty villains and beautiful women. And I hoped to one day write thrillers about crime, espionage and terrorism. 

Although I have not yet been able to publish my crime novel, I've published more than 50 short crime fiction stories.    

A house on a beach

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Years after reading his novel and watching Sean Connery as Bond in the films, I was thrilled to spend a week with my wife at Fleming's villa Goldeneye in Jamaica in the early 1980s, where he wrote all of the James Bond thrillers.   

I met his elderly Jamacian housekeeper Violet, whom I read about in the Ian Fleming biographies. With tears in her eyes, she said Ian Fleming was a good man. Violet prepared authentic Jamaican food for us, but I asked her to make the food a bit less spicy.

I wrote each night at Fleming's old desk where he penned the James Bond novels, and I went swimming during the day in his private cove and laid on his private beach with my wife.

At the time Goldeneye was rustic as it was when Ian Fleming lived there. No air conditioning, no TV or a pool. I listened to the BBC news each night on the radio.

It was a magical place we will also remember.       

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As History.com notes, Ian Fleming led an interesting, if all too short, life: 

On August 12, 1964, the British author and journalist Ian Fleming, creator of James Bond, the world’s most famous fictional spy, dies of a heart attack at age 56 in Kent, England. 

Fleming’s series of novels about the debonair Agent 007, based in part on their dashing author’s real-life experiences, spawned one of the most lucrative film franchises in history. Ian Lancaster Fleming was born into a well-to-do family in London on May 29, 1908. As an adult, he worked as a foreign correspondent, a stockbroker and a personal assistant to Britain’s director of naval intelligence during World War II–experiences that would all provide fodder for his Bond novels. 

You can read the rest of the piece via the below link:

James Bond creator Ian Fleming dies - HISTORY 

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You can also read my Counterterrorism magazine piece on Ian Fleming's war and two of my Crime Beat columns on Ian Fleming via the below links:

Paul Davis On Crime: My Piece On The 30 Assault Unit, The British WWII Commando Group Created By Ian Fleming, The Creator Of James Bond

Paul Davis On Crime: My Crime Beat Column: A Look Back At Ian Fleming's Iconic James Bond Character

Paul Davis On Crime: My Crime Beat Column: The Ian Fleming and James Bond Phenomenon

A book cover of a casino royale

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An Implacable Foe: My Counterterrorism Magazine Q&A With Sean M. Wiswesser, Retired CIA Officer And The Author Of 'Tradecraft, Tactics And Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence And Putin's Secret War'

Counterterrorism magazine published my Q&A with Sean M. Wiswesser, a retired CIA officer and author of Tradecraft, Tactics and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War.

You can read the pages above and below or the following text:



Mr. Wiswesser has nearly thirty years of experience working as a national security professional with intelligence, foreign service, and defense organizations.

As a senior operations officer with the CIA, he served on multiple overseas tours and many other deployments on temporary duty, including war-zone service. He was a chief of station and had multiple joint-duty assignments with intelligence community partners.

Mr. Wiswesser was a Morehead Scholar at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill with a bachelor's degree in history and Russian & Slavic linguistics. He was awarded a Master of Strategic Studies in 2023 from the Air War College and received the Russia Integrated Deterrence.

Mr. Wiswesser is the author of “Tradecraft, Tactics and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Dirty Tricks,” published by the Naval Institute Press.

Sean M. Wiswesser was interviewed by Paul Davis.

IACSP: I enjoyed your book on Russian intelligence. I’ve been interested in Russian intelligence since I was a teenager and read spy thrillers. I did security work while serving in the U.S. Navy as a young sailor on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War and later as Department of Defense civilian employee. I was trained to guard against Russian intelligence and I attended many FBI, NSA, DIA and CIA briefings and training sessions on Russian intelligence, but there was still a lot in the book that I didn't know.

My first question is why did you write the book?

Wiswesser: There is a saying, if you're going to write a book, write the book only you can write. In the CIA I was a Russia guy, which meant I had to focus on my career and tradecraft, particularly denied area tradecraft, so in other words how we operated in the toughest of environments overseas, like Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. As a member of our senior expert cadre with a focus on those areas, I had an idea about writing a book and then I went to the War College towards the end of my career, and it gave me some faith that maybe I could actually do it. I got published in a couple of books at the  War College and another one with the Cambridge Publishing House on the Ukraine War. I would never do a memoir; I’m not interested in that. I knew it would be focused on our adversaries, because that's where I want to do damage to them. I don’t have any grudges or concerns, and I didn’t want to do an expose on us. In fact, I want to do an expose on them, the bad guys. So that was the motivation and there was the added burden of having to get CIA to clear it, so that was an extra step in the process, but in the end it all worked out.

IACSP: You say the book was written for general readers, but why should everyday Americans be concerned about Russian intelligence in particular?

Wiswesser: Well, Paul. They are an implacable foe. Early in the book, I talk about a Russian intelligence officer in the period post 911. Even though I was trained, I wanted to ask him, maybe somewhat naively in retrospect, I said, well, what about Bush and Putin agreeing that the Global War on Terrorism is more important, are we all going get along? And he was betraying his country and helping us, he just laughed at me and said you have always been the main enemy, you are the main enemy, you will be the main enemy of Russia and our security services. For us, the United States comes first.

So I think that we’ve been engaged in 20 years of war, the Global War on Terrorism, the Iraq War, and now we have another war with Iran, Russia has never taken its eyes off of us, because democracy is the only ultimate threat to Putin that he's really concerned about. Democracy and Democratic institutions. Those are the only true threats to his rein.


IACSP: Your book is subtitled “Putin's Secret War.” How would you describe a secret war?

Wiswesser: The secret war is the hybrid war, the gray zone tactics. Traditional espionage, but also cyber operations and the information war. Now in Europe you see the other aspects that I touched on in the later chapters of the book. Sabotage, assassinations and “wet work.” It’s not a new thing. These are old Cold War tactics going back decades into the Cold War, even to the time of the Bolshevik revolution.  

IACSP: How would you briefly describe the Russian SVR, the FSB and the GRU?

Wiswesser: The FSB is the largest of the services, going somewhere around 400,000 officers across Russia, including 200,000 border guards. There are there are no equivalencies to the U.S. intelligence community. People say they are sort of like the FBI. Nothing could be further from the truth. They don't swear their allegiance to the Constitution; there are no laws that they have to worry about breaking. The FSB has the singular mission of protection of the regime, and the protection of Vladimir Putin as the head of it. Remember, he is the former director of the FSB. Their allegiance is to him. The FSB is responsible for counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and wide swaths of activities, including corruption and feeding their own pockets.

The next largest is the GRU, known today as the GU, military intelligence. They number probably between 70,000 and 100,000. They incorporate our DIA, NSA and NRO. They have a vast bureaucracy that they're in charge of in terms of military intelligence and signals intelligence, imagery and otherwise. And they have the Spetsnaz Brigades, the equivalent of the Tier-1 Delta Force and the Navy SEALs.

The SVR is the smallest of the three. They are the foreign intelligence service directorate, numbering probably around 30,000. They are the remnants of the old First Chief Directorate of the KGB, which was in charge of foreign intelligence. That’s a brief summary of the three. 

IACSP: You mention in the book something that was new to me, at least on the grand scale that you note, of how corruption is rampant in Russian intelligence and is a major weakness of their intelligence services. Would you explain that?

Wiswesser: The life of a Russian intelligence officer is overwhelmingly obsessed with and dominated by corruption. Russian intelligence officers and their bureaucracies are deeply embedded to the overall Russian kleptocracy, which is their government. They are constantly on the take for graft, greed, scamming and scheming of all different types, in order to make money for themselves and their patronage networks. I point out in the book that Russian intelligence services resemble more mafia gangs and giant feudal systems then they do anything that resembles the government bureaucracies in the West. These are systems that are set up where you have to make your boss look good and you have to literally line the pockets of your boss all the way up the chain. Every Russian intelligence officer that I worked with him in my career all said the obsession of their services is corruption, making money.

IACSP: In the book you state that you debriefed several Russian defectors. Why generally do they defect and how do they adjust to the US?

Wiswesser: Defectors by and large come to the West because our message resonates. Another journalist asked me if we were losing the intelligence war. No, we're winning. The reason is we will always be winning because our message is far more appealing to Russian intelligence officers. They know that corruption is there, and they know there's no chance of their children ever achieving great things based only on their merits. That's what they seek out eventually, especially in middle age. They realize they have been struggling their whole life for a lie.

IACSP: What sparked your initial interest in Russian language and culture?

Wiswesser: When I was 14 years old, I was really fortunate that I won a scholarship at an all-boys boarding school outside of Philadelphia. The school had a great language program, and I got to study Russian for four years with an excellent instructor named Rick Borger.

I don’t have a strong American accent, which later in my career that was a huge benefit for me. When I was trying to meet Russians for the first time at receptions out there it was a huge advantage that they didn't immediately identify me as an American. With that interest in Russian language came a desire to go to Russia to study, which I did in college. I was fascinated and I hopefully it comes across my great respect for the Russian people and their great language and culture and literature, but I also saw the darker side of their society. The people lived in fear. I decided that I wanted to join the intelligence community and fight back against the Soviet regime.  

IACSP:  One of the things I found most interesting in your book is that you write about how Russian intelligence interfered with our presidential elections. Did they interfere in favor of Trump or were they just interested in dividing Americans and damaging our electoral process?

Wiswesser: Their attack was fundamentally against democracy more broadly. This is not new. They have been doing it for decades.  They want to spread the false idea that you can't have free and fair elections in the West.  They want our youth in America and other democracies to give up. Any benefit to an individual candidate is incidental.

IACSP: You write about Putin, the former KGB Lieutenant Colonel and later the director of the FSB. He's a big supporter of Russian intelligence. What do you think will happen when he dies?

Wiswesser: I don't believe fundamentally that there's any opposition to Putin whatsoever. Whoever replaces him, he's going to be a hand-picked successor, most likely from Putin’s inter circle of those veterans of the KGB that came with him when he was the deputy mayor of Saint Petersburg. Those veterans are fiercely loyal to him. They're completely beholden to him. So, Putin is going to decide who's going to succeed him. 

IACSP: Thank you for your service with the CIA and thank you for speaking to us.

Paul Davis, a longtime contributor to the Journal, also writes the online IACSP Threatcon column.   

Note: Sean Wiswesser posted: 

Thank you, Paul! Am honored by this kind review. Here is link to my book for those that want to order, much appreciated:

https://a.co/d/07sduvsz

Thank you!
Sean Wiswesser
CIA Senior Operations Officer (Ret.) 
Author/Lecturer on Russian Intelligence/Defense/Security Issues                                             

The U.S. Takedown of Russian and Chinese Hackers

Counterterrorism magazine published my piece on the American takedown of Russian and Chinese hackers.

You can read the pages above and below or the following text: 





The U.S. intelligence community often warns Americans about foreign computer system hackers. Some of the hackers are criminals, corrupting computer systems for fun and profit, and some are state-sponsored hackers looking to undermine American government and business institutions.

Russia and China are the usual suspects when state-sponsored computer intrusions are noted. Thankfully, the U.S. had some success in thwarting them.   

Back in April, the National Security Agency (NSA) and other federal agencies co-sealed an FBI public service announcement, “Russian GRU Exploiting Vulnerable Routers to Steal Sensitive Information.”

The public service announcement accompanied an announcement from U. S. Attorney David Metcalf in Philadelphia, the Department of Justice, and the FBI that a court-authorized technical operation to neutralize the U.S. portion of a network of small office/home office (SOHO) routers compromised by a unit within Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU: Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenis) Military Unit 26165, also known as APT28, Sofacy Group, Forest Blizzard, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, and Sednit.

The GRU is the Russian military intelligence agency that operates worldwide alongside the Russian foreign intelligence agency the SVR, which is essentially the old First Main Directorate of the old KGB.

The GRU, the military group that includes the Spetsnaz special operations forces and the “wet work” unit that murdered a Russians defector with radiation poisoned tea, also employs full-time hackers.       

According to Metcalf, the hacker unit used the routers to facilitate malicious Domain Name System (DNS) hijacking operations against worldwide targets of intelligence interest to the Russian government, including individuals in the military, government, and critical infrastructure sectors.

“Since at least 2024, GRU actors have exploited known vulnerabilities to steal credentials for thousands of TP-Link routers worldwide. The actors then accessed many of these compromised routers without authorization and manipulated their settings to redirect DNS requests to GRU-controlled servers - i.e., malicious DNS resolvers. GRU actors were indiscriminate in their initial targeting and manipulation of routers. The actors then implemented an automated filtering process to determine which DNS requests were of interest and warranted interception. For select targets, the GRU’s DNS resolvers provided fraudulent DNS records for specific domains that mimicked legitimate services — including Microsoft Outlook Web Access — to facilitate Actor-in-the-Middle attacks against encrypted victim network traffic. In doing so, the GRU actors harvested unencrypted passwords, authentication tokens, emails, and other sensitive information from devices on the same network as the compromised TP-Link routers,” the announcement stated.

“Russian military intelligence once again hijacked Americans’ hardware to commandeer critical data,” said Metcalf. “In the face of continued aggression by our nation-state adversaries, the U.S. government will respond just as aggressively. Working with the FBI — and our partners around the world — we are committed to disrupting and exposing such threats to our nation’s cybersecurity.”

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg added. “The GRU’s predatory use of networks in American homes and businesses for its malicious cyber operations remains a serious and persistent threat,” said “NSD will continue to use every tool at our disposal to detect such intrusions and expel hostile foreign actors from our Nation’s networks.”

“Operation Masquerade — led by FBI Boston — is the latest example of how we’re defending our homeland from Russia’s GRU, which weaponized routers owned by unsuspecting Americans in more than 23 states to steal sensitive government, military, and critical infrastructure information,” said Special Agent in Charge Ted E. Docks, of the FBI’s Boston Field Office. “The FBI utilized cutting edge technology and leveraged our private sector and international partners to unmask this malicious activity and remediate routers. Now we’re asking everyone who has a router to secure it, update its firmware, and replace it if needed. By working together, we can guard against nefarious nation state actors trying to compromise our national security.”

“Operation Masquerade demonstrates the FBI’s commitment to identifying, exposing, and disrupting the Russian government's efforts to compromise American devices, steal sensitive information, and target critical infrastructure,” said Assistant Director Brett Leatherman of FBI’s Cyber Division. “GRU actors compromised routers in the US and around the world, hijacking them to conduct espionage. Given the scale of this threat, sounding the alarm wasn't enough. The FBI conducted a court-authorized operation to harden compromised routers across the United States. We urge all router owners to take the remediation steps outlined today, because defending our networks requires all of us. The FBI will continue to use its authorities to identify and impose costs on state-sponsored actors who target the American people.”

According to court documents unsealed in Philadelphia, the FBI developed a series of commands to send to compromised routers in the United States, designed to collect evidence regarding the GRU actors’ activity, reset DNS settings (i.e., remove GRU DNS resolvers and force routers to obtain legitimate DNS resolvers from their Internet Service Providers (ISPs)), and to otherwise prevent the GRU actors from exploiting the original means of unauthorized access.

As described in court documents, the government extensively tested the operation on firmware and hardware for affected TP-Link routers. Other than stymieing the GRU’s ability to access the routers, the operation did not impact the routers’ normal functionality or collect the legitimate users’ content information.

The court-authorized steps to remediate compromised routers can be reversed by legitimate users at any time through factory resets with hardware reset buttons. Legitimate users can also reverse changes by logging into web management pages and restoring desired settings (e.g., factory default settings).

Another case in point is when the U.S. Justice Department released information on the extradition of a Chinese hacker on April 27th.

The Justice Department announced that Xu Zewei, 34, of the People’s Republic of China was extradited to the United States and appeared in U.S. District Court in Houston on a nine-count indictment related to his involvement in computer intrusions between February 2020 and June 2021.

Certain of those computer intrusions allegedly are part of the HAFNIUM computer intrusion campaign that compromised thousands of computers worldwide, including in the United States. Other intrusions targeted U.S. COVID-19 research during the height of the pandemic. Xu is charged along with Zhang Yu, 44, who is also a PRC national.

According to court documents, officers of the PRC’s Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB) directed Xu to conduct this hacking. The MSS and SSSB are PRC intelligence services responsible for PRC’s domestic counterintelligence, non-military foreign intelligence, and aspects of the PRC’s political and domestic security. When Xu conducted the computer intrusions, he allegedly worked for a company named Shanghai Powerock Network Co. Ltd. (Powerock). Powerock was one of many “enabling” companies in the PRC that conducted hacking for the PRC government.

“The United States is committed to pursuing hackers who steal information from U.S. businesses and universities and threaten our cybersecurity,” said Assistant Attorney General Eisenberg. “I commend the prosecutors and investigators who have worked hard and sought justice for years in this investigation, and we look forward to proving our case in court.”

“Xu Zewei will stand in a federal courtroom to answer for crimes that struck at the heart of American science and security — allegedly stealing COVID-19 research from our universities when the world needed it most,” said Acting U.S. Attorney John G.E. Marck for the Southern District of Texas. “We have pursued this moment across years and continents, and the message this office sends today is the same one we sent when we first unsealed this indictment: we will work to protect the American people.”

“The extradition of Xu Zewei demonstrates the FBI's reach extends well beyond U.S. borders,” said FBI Assistant Director Leatherman. “Xu will now answer for his alleged role in HAFNIUM, a group responsible for a vast intrusion campaign directed by China's Ministry of State Security that compromised more than 12,700 U.S. organizations. He is one of many contractors the Chinese government uses to obscure its hand in cyber operations, and others who do the same face the same risk. The FBI thanks our Italian law enforcement colleagues, especially the Polizia Postale, whose partnership led to Xu's arrest in Milan and his extradition to the United States.”

According to court documents, in early 2020, Xu and his co-conspirators hacked and otherwise targeted U.S.-based universities, immunologists, and virologists conducting research into COVID‑19 vaccines, treatment, and testing. Xu and others reported their activities to officers in the SSSB who were supervising and directing the hacking activities. For example, on or about Feb. 19, 2020, Xu provided an SSSB officer with confirmation that he had compromised the network of a research university located in the Southern District of Texas.

On or about Feb. 22, 2020, the SSSB officer directed Xu to target and access specific email accounts (mailboxes) belonging to virologists and immunologists engaged in COVID-19 research for the university. Xu later confirmed for the SSSB officer that he acquired the contents of the researchers’ mailboxes.

The charges further allege that beginning in late 2020, Xu and his co-conspirators exploited certain vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server, a widely used Microsoft product for sending, receiving, and storing email messages. Their exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server was at the forefront of a massive campaign targeting thousands of computers worldwide and known publicly as “HAFNIUM.” In March 2021, Microsoft publicly disclosed the intrusion campaign by state-sponsored hackers operating out of China. Throughout March 2021, Microsoft and other industry partners released detection tools, patches, and other information to assist victim entities in identifying and mitigating this cyber incident. Additionally, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released a Joint Advisory on Compromise of Microsoft Exchange Server on March 10, 2021. However, by the end of March 2021, hundreds of web shells remained on certain U.S.-based computers running Microsoft Exchange Server software.

In April 2021, the Justice Department announced a court-authorized operation to remediate hundreds of computers in the United States made vulnerable by HAFNIUM actors. On July 21, 2021, the United States and foreign partners attributed the HAFNIUM campaign to the PRC’s MSS.

Among the victims of Xu’s alleged exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server were another university located in the Southern District of Texas and a law firm with offices worldwide, including in Washington, D.C. After exploiting computers running Microsoft Exchange Server, Xu and his co-conspirators installed web shells on them to enable their remote administration. The indictment alleges that these web shells were specific to HAFNIUM actors at the time. As with the earlier COVID-19 research intrusions, Xu and Zhang worked together on the HAFNIUM intrusions, under the supervision and direction of SSSB officers. For example, on or about Jan. 30, 2021, Xu confirmed to Zhang that he had compromised the other university’s network. Later, on or about Feb. 28, 2021, Xu updated a SSSB officer on his successful intrusions. This SSSB officer then directed Xu to obtain a list of other, successful intrusions from a second SSSB officer. Unauthorized access to the law firm’s network allowed Xu and his co-conspirators to steal information from mailboxes and search them for information regarding specific U.S. policy makers and government agencies. Their search terms included “Chinese sources,” “MSS,” and “HongKong.”

As described in the July 2025 announcement of charges against Xu, the PRC uses an extensive network of private companies and contractors in China to hack and steal information in a manner that obscured the PRC government’s involvement. Operating from their safe haven and motivated by profit, this network of private companies and contractors in China cast a wide net to identify vulnerable computers, exploit those computers, and then identify information that it could sell directly or indirectly to the PRC government. This largely indiscriminate approach results in more victims in the United States and elsewhere, more systems worldwide left vulnerable to future exploitation by third parties, and more stolen information, often of no interest to the PRC government and, therefore, sold to other third parties.

“Xu is charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each count; conspiracy to cause damage to and obtain information by unauthorized access to protected computers, to commit wire fraud, and to commit identity theft, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; two counts of obtaining information by unauthorized access to protected computers, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; two counts of intentional damage to a protected computer, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison; and aggravated identity theft, which carries a maximum penalty of two years in prison,” the Justice Department stated.

 Zhang Yu, remains at large.

Paul Davis, a longtime contributor to the Journal, also writes the online Threatcon column.