Counterterrorism magazine published my piece on a former sailor turned spy Jinchao Wei (seen in the above photo) who was sentenced to sixteen years in prison.
You can read the piece via the below pages or the following text:
Sailor Spy Sentenced to Sixteen Years in
Prison
By Paul Davis
I
spoke to a retired naval officer, who like other active duty, retired and
former U.S. Navy sailors, was angry upon hearing about Jinchao Wei, a
sailor-turned-spy for the Chinese.
The
retired naval officer, a “Mustang” officer who previously served as an enlisted
man in the Navy, told me that Wei should have been punished far more than a
prison sentence.
“This
spy and traitor should face a firing squad.”
As
a Navy veteran who served on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War, I
understand the anger. We all swore to defend the country and the Constitution,
and those of us who held secret clearances signed an agreement never to divulge
Navy secrets.
Also,
as a Defense Department civilian employee who performed security work for more
than 33 years after serving four years in the Navy, I worked diligently to
prevent our countries’ adversaries from obtaining classified information. But
even the best security procedures and the best security people can fail to
detect the insider threat – a dishonest and disloyal military member, a DOD civilian
employee, or a defense contractor.
Wei
dishonored himself and committed an act of espionage when he passed information
to a Chinese intelligence officer.
On
January 12, Jinchao Wei, a former U.S. Navy sailor who was convicted of
espionage by a federal jury in August 2025, was sentenced in federal court
today to 200 months in prison.
According to the U.S. Justice Department, Wei, 25, also known as
Patrick Wei, was arrested in August 2023 on espionage charges as he arrived for
work on the amphibious assault ship U.S.S. Essex at Naval Base San Diego, the
homeport of the Pacific Fleet.
He was indicted by a federal grand jury, accused of selling
national defense information to an intelligence officer working for the
People’s Republic of China for $12,000.
“Following a five-day trial and one day of deliberation, the
jury convicted Wei of six crimes, including conspiracy to commit espionage,
espionage, and unlawful export of, and conspiracy to export, technical data
related to defense articles in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations. He was found not guilty of one count
of naturalization fraud,” the Justice Department stated.
“Members of the United States military swear to support and
defend the Constitution of the United States,” said Deputy Attorney General
Todd Blanche. “This active-duty U.S. Navy sailor betrayed his country and
compromised the national security of the United States. The Justice Department
will not tolerate this behavior. We stand ready to investigate, defend, and
protect the interests of the American people.”
According to evidence presented at trial, Wei, in his role as a
machinist’s mate, held a U.S. security clearance and had access to sensitive
national defense information about the ship’s weapons, propulsion and
desalination systems. Amphibious assault ships like the Essex resemble small
aircraft carriers and allow the U.S. military to project power and maintain
presence by serving as the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious readiness
and expeditionary strike capabilities.
“On February 14, 2022, Wei was recruited by a Chinese
intelligence officer via social media who at first portrayed himself as a naval
enthusiast who worked for the state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation. The evidence showed that even during the early days of his
espionage career, Wei strongly suspected the intelligence officer’s true
identity and motive,” the Justice Department noted. “
On February 22, 2022, Wei told a friend who was also in the U.S.
Navy that he thought he was “on the radar of a China intelligence
organization,” as he was in contact with an individual who was “extremely
suspicious,” “interested in the maintenance cycle of naval ships,” and wanted
him to “walk the pier” to “see which ships are docked” on a “daily basis.” Wei
said that this person would pay him $500. Wei told his friend that he is “no
idiot” and that “this is quite obviously fucking espionage.”
Wei’s friend suggested that Wei delete the contact. Instead of
heeding his friend’s advice, the next day Wei transitioned his communications
with the intelligence officer to a different encrypted messaging application
that he believed was more secure and began spying for the intelligence officer.
“The evidence showed that between March 2022 and when he was
arrested in August 2023, Wei, at the request of the intelligence officer, sent
photographs and videos of the Essex, advised the officer of the location of
various Navy ships, and described the defensive weapons of the Essex. He also
described problems with his ship and other ships based at Naval Base San Diego
and elsewhere. And, he sent the intelligence officer thousands of pages of
technical and operational information about U.S. Navy surface warfare ships
like the Essex that he took from restricted U.S. Navy computer systems,” stated
the Justice Department.
“In exchange for this information, the officer paid Wei more
than $12,000 over 18 months. In one of his larger thefts of U.S. Navy data, Wei
sold the intelligence officer at least 30 technical and operating manuals about
U.S. Navy systems. These manuals contained export control warnings and detailed
the operations of multiple systems aboard the Essex and similar ships,
including power, steering, weapons control, aircraft and deck elevators, as
well as damage and casualty controls.
“In total, Wei sold the intelligence officer approximately 60
technical and operating manuals about U.S. Navy ships, as well as dozens of
photographs and papers about the U.S. Navy and Wei’s assignments on the Essex.
Many of the manuals contained conspicuous export-control warnings on their
cover pages.”
The Justice Department explained that during the trial, the
government presented evidence including phone conversations, electronic
messages, and audio messages that Wei exchanged with his Chinese handler. These
messages showed how they communicated, what they spoke about, the need for secrecy,
the efforts they made to cover their tracks, the tasks issued by his case
handler, and how Wei was paid for his work via an online payment method.
As their relationship developed, Wei called his handler “Big
Brother Andy” and obliged requests to keep their relationship secret by using
multiple encrypted apps; deleting messages and accounts; using digital “dead
drops” that disappear in 72 hours; and using a new computer and phone provided
by his handler.
The government told the jury that the evidence showed Wei was
aware that what he was doing was wrong. He had received recent training from
the Navy regarding how to detect recruitment efforts from foreign governments;
he attempted to conceal his activity; and he searched the internet about
another case in which a U.S. Navy sailor was convicted of espionage, even
reading a Department of Justice press release about that case.
“Much of the evidence showed the evolution of Wei’s relationship
with his handler - Wei’s increasing willingness to collect more and more
sensitive information, and the intelligence officer’s employment of
intelligence tradecraft to keep developing Wei as a spy and to conceal their
relationship and activities from U.S. authorities,” the Justice Department
stated. “For example, the jury saw photographs of the hand-written receipts
that Wei created and sent to his handler to be paid and conversations that Wei
and his handler had regarding the handler’s increasingly generous offers to
Wei, such as a trip for Wei and his mother to travel to China. Moreover, the
jury was presented with documents and records obtained from electronic accounts
demonstrating the intelligence officer’s identity as a PRC intelligence
officer, including photographs and identification documents.”
During his post-arrest interview Wei admitted that he gave the
intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operating manuals and
export-controlled data about U.S. Navy surface warfare ships, and that the
intelligence officer paid him thousands of dollars for these materials. He also
admitted that he knew that his actions were wrong and that he had tried to hide
his activities. When the interviewing agents asked Wei how he would describe
what he had been doing with the intelligence officer, Wei responded,
“espionage.”
Wei, during his post-arrest interview with FBI: “I’m screwed.”
FBI: “What makes you say that?”
Wei: “That I’m sharing the unclassified document to—I
mean document with, uhm, him . . . I’m not supposed to do that.”
The crime of espionage under U.S. Code Section 794 has never
been charged in the Southern District of California. The statute is reserved
for the most serious circumstances involving the passage of national defense
information intended to harm the United States or for the benefit of a foreign
power.
The case was investigated by the FBI and the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service and was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney John
Parmley from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California
and Adam Barry, former Trial Attorney from the National Security Division’s
Counterintelligence and Export Control Section who is currently Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Columbia.
John A. Eisenberg, the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security, stated after the sentence, “Wei swore loyalty to the United States
when he joined the Navy and reaffirmed that oath when he became a citizen. He
then accepted the solemn responsibility of protecting this Nation’s secrets
when the United States entrusted him with sensitive Navy information.
“He made a mockery of these commitments when he chose to
endanger our Nation and our servicemembers by selling U.S. military secrets to
a Chinese intelligence officer for personal profit. Today’s sentence reflects
our commitment to ensuring those who sell our Nation’s secrets pay a very high
price for their betrayal.”
NCIS Director Omar Lopez added, “By sharing thousands of
documents, operating manuals, and export-controlled and sensitive information
with a Chinese intelligence officer, Petty Officer Wei knowingly betrayed his
fellow service members and the American people.
“Today’s outcome demonstrates the shared commitment of NCIS,
FBI, the Department of Justice and our Intelligence partners to aggressively
pursue and hold accountable those who would put the lethality and readiness of
our Naval fleet, as well as our national security, at risk. NCIS remains
steadfast in its mission to protect U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces and
warfighting capabilities by neutralizing counterintelligence threats ashore,
afloat and in cyberspace.”
Mark Dargis, the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s San Diego
Field Office, stated “Today’s sentence marks the conclusion of a
first-of-its-kind espionage investigation in the district and reflects the
seriousness of Wei’s egregious actions against his own country. The FBI will
aggressively defend our homeland from anyone threatening our national security,
including those on the inside betraying their sworn duty to the United States.
We remain steadfast in protecting the American people and will continue to work
with all our law enforcement partners to successfully carry out this mission.”
Paul Davis, a Navy veteran and retired Defense Department civilian employee, is a longtime contributor to the Journal. He also writes the online Threatcon column for IACSP.
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