Showing posts with label economic espionage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic espionage. Show all posts

Friday, November 7, 2025

Fiber Laser Expert Convicted By Federal Jury Of Economic Espionage And Theft Of Trade Secrets

The U.S. Justice Department released the below information:

A federal jury has convicted Ji Wang, 63, of Painted Post, N.Y., of two counts of economic espionage, one count of theft of trade secrets, one count of attempted economic espionage, and one count of attempted theft of trade secrets.  Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg, together with U.S. Attorney Michael DiGiacomo for the Western District of New York, announced the verdict.

“Yesterday, a federal jury found Wang guilty of stealing sensitive defense research from his employer and attempting to use it to pursue personal profit at the expense our national security,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. “We are committed to combating economic espionage and holding accountable those who disregard our export-control laws and the security of U.S. technology. This verdict reaffirms that such betrayals of trust will not go unpunished.”

“This conviction demonstrates the importance of protecting trade secrets developed in the United States, especially those with military applications,” said U.S. Attorney DiGiacomo. “My office will continue pursue and prosecute those that steal such information.”

Wang was born in China and immigrated to the United States in 1998 to work for Corning Incorporated.  Between 2002 and 2007, Wang was assigned to work on a joint research and development project funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) and Corning.  The goal of the 5-year, $11.4 million project was to develop optical fibers for high-powered lasers with military and commercial applications.  DARPA and Corning aimed to increase the power of fiber lasers by more than a factor of 1000.  DARPA sought to develop this technology to create laser weapons capable of shooting down drones and missiles.

On or about July 1, 2016, Wang stole hundreds of files that contained non-public data generated during the DARPA project, including trade-secret manufacturing technology that would have enabled him to fabricate all manner of specialty optical fibers, including for fiber lasers.

Ten days before Wang stole the trade secret files, he had applied for China’s Thousand Talents Plan Award.  The Thousand Talents Plan Award was an initiative by the Chinese government aimed at people who were born in China and immigrated to the United States, to study or work in science and technology fields.  The Thousand Talents Plan Award incentivized these people to return to China by promising millions of dollars of investment to award recipients who returned to China.  Two months after Wang stole the trade secret files, he was selected to receive a Thousand Talents Plan Award.

Wang was negotiating with Chinese government entities to start a specialty fiber business in China from at least 2014 through 2017.  Wang was negotiating to receive tens of millions of dollars in investment from Chinese government entities, who would have been shareholders in his new venture.  Wang’s business plans showed that he was planning to use the stolen trade-secret files to start this business in China. Wang’s business plans also touted the military applications of the technology.  In one such business plan, which Wang submitted to a Chinese government entity, he advertised that specialty fibers “can also be installed on military vehicles,” including “tanks.”  Wang claimed that such use of the technology on military vehicles could “be key to deciding victory or defeat.”  Ultimately, law enforcement disrupted Wang’s efforts before he was able to start a new business and exploit the technology he stole.

“Mr. Wang stole sensitive technology that Corning, Inc. and DARPA spent millions of dollars developing so he could line his own pockets and help our adversaries undermine U.S. national security,” said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division. “For years, China’s government has waged a vast economic espionage campaign designed to put our nation at risk and American companies out of business. This conviction makes clear that the FBI and our partners will continue to hold accountable anyone looking to steal U.S. innovation for our enemies.” 

“The Bureau of Industry and Security remains committed to working alongside our law enforcement and industry partners to prevent the unlawful transfer of sensitive technologies,” said Jonathan Carson, Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement.

The verdict is the result of an investigation by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting under the direction of Special Agent In-Charge Philip Tejera, and Special Agents of the Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, New York Field Office acting under the direction of Special Agent-in-Charge Jonathan Carson. Additional assistance was provided by Homeland Security Investigations in Detroit, Michigan.  The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Meghan K. McGuire of the Western District of New York and Trial Attorneys Nicholas Hunter and Brendan Geary of the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section of the National Security Division.

Economic espionage carries a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison and theft of trade secrets carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.  Sentencing is scheduled for April 15, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. before U.S. District Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr., who presided over the trial. 

Monday, February 3, 2025

Former Senior Adviser For The Federal Reserve Indicted On Charges of Economic Espionage

The U.S. Justice Department released the below information:

John Harold Rogers, 63, of Vienna, Virginia, a former Senior Adviser for the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB), was arrested today on charges that he conspired to steal Federal Reserve trade secrets for the benefit of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

In furtherance of the conspiracy, allegedly made false statements to the Office of Inspector General for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (FRB-OIG), and those false statements had a material impact on its investigation.

“As alleged, the defendant violated the trust placed in him by the Federal Reserve Bank by putting U.S. trade secrets in the hands of his PRC co-conspirators, knowing full well that such information would benefit the PRC Government and PRC instrumentalities,” said Devin DeBacker, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “The Justice Department will continue to use all the tools at its disposal to disrupt economic espionage and protect our national security.”

“President Trump tasks us with protecting our fellow Americans from all enemies, foreign and domestic. As alleged in the indictment, this defendant leveraged his position within the Federal Reserve to pass sensitive financial information to the Chinese government, a designated adversary,” said U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr. for the District of Columbia. “Let this indictment serve as a warning to all who seek to betray or exploit the United States: law enforcement will find you and hold you accountable.”

“As alleged in the indictment, Rogers betrayed his country while employed at the Federal Reserve by providing restricted U.S. financial and economic information to Chinese government intelligence officers,” said Assistant Director Kevin Vorndran of the FBI Counterintelligence Division. “This information could allow adversaries to illegally gain a strategic economic advantage at the expense of the U.S. This indictment sends a clear message that the FBI and our partners will hold accountable those who threaten our national security.”

“The Chinese Communist Party has expanded its economic espionage campaign to target U.S. government financial policies and trade secrets in an effort to undermine the United States and become the sole superpower,” said Assistant Director in Charge David Sundberg of the FBI Washington Field Office. “Today's indictment represents the FBI’s unwavering commitment to protect U.S. national security interests and U.S. jobs and bring to justice those who are willing to betray their country for personal gain.”

“This indictment sends a clear message that those who deliberately misuse sensitive Federal Reserve information for their own personal gain and lie about it to investigators will be held accountable for their actions,” said Special Agent in Charge John T. Perez of the FRB-OIG, Headquarters Operations.

According to the indictment, Rogers, a U.S. citizen with a Ph.D. in economics, worked as a Senior Adviser in FRB’s Division of International Finance of the FRB from 2010 until 2021, where he was entrusted with confidential FRB information. The confidential information that Rogers allegedly shared with his Chinese co-conspirators, who worked for the intelligence and security apparatus of China and who posed as graduate students at a PRC university, is economically valuable when secret.

China holds a large amount of U.S. foreign debt (approximately $816 billion as of October 2024). The data Rogers shared with his co-conspirators could allow China to manipulate the U.S. market, in a manner similar to insider trading. Gaining advance knowledge of U.S. economic policy, including advance knowledge of changes to the federal funds rate, could provide China with an advantage when selling or buying U.S. bonds or securities.

The indictment alleges that, from at least 2018, Rogers allegedly exploited his employment with the FRB by soliciting trade-secret information regarding proprietary economic data sets, deliberations about tariffs targeting China, briefing books for designated governors, and sensitive information about Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) deliberations and forthcoming announcements. He passed that information electronically to his personal email account, in violation of FRB policy, or printed it prior to traveling to China, in preparation for meetings with his co-conspirators.

Under the guise of teaching “classes,” Rogers met with his co-conspirators in hotel rooms in China where he conveyed sensitive, trade-secret information that belonged to the FRB and the FOMC. In 2023, Rogers was paid approximately $450,000 as a part-time professor at a Chinese university.

On Feb. 4, 2020, in response to questioning by the FRB-OIG, Rogers lied about his accessing and passage of sensitive information and his associations with his co-conspirators.

Rogers is charged with conspiracy to commit economic espionage and with making false statements.

The FBI Washington Field Office and FRB-OIG are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Kimberly Paschall for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorneys Nicholas Hunter and Steve Marzen of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Section are prosecuting the case.

An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Wednesday, September 20, 2023

The Chinese Communist Threat


The FBI offers a good video on the rise and ambitions of the Communist Chinese Government.

According to the FBI, the counterintelligence and economic espionage efforts emanating from the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party are a grave threat to the economic well-being and democratic values of the United States.

“Confronting this threat is the FBI’s top counterintelligence priority,” the FBI stated. “To be clear, the adversary is not the Chinese people or people of Chinese descent or heritage. The threat comes from the programs and policies pursued by an authoritarian government.

“The Chinese government is employing tactics that seek to influence lawmakers and public opinion to achieve policies that are more favorable to China. At the same time, the Chinese government is seeking to become the world’s greatest superpower through predatory lending and business practices, systematic theft of intellectual property, and brazen cyber intrusions.” 

The FBI notes that China's efforts target businesses, academic institutions, researchers, lawmakers, and the general public and will require a whole-of-society response. The government and the private sector must commit to working together to better understand and counter the threat. 

"The greatest long-term threat to our nation's information and intellectual property, and to our economic vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China," said FBI Director Christopher Wray. 

You can watch the video via the below link:     

Made in Beijing: The Plan for Global Market Domination — FBI

You can also read my Philadelphia Weekly Crime Beat column on economic espionage below:

Note: You can click on the above to enlarge.

Monday, May 2, 2022

Scientist Convicted By Federal Jury Of Conspiracy To Steal Trade Secrets Belonging To GlaxoSmithKline

The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Philadelphia released the below information:

PHILADELPHIA – United States Attorney Jennifer Arbittier Williams announced that Gongda Xue, 52, formerly a resident of Allschwil, Switzerland, a legal permanent resident of Switzerland and citizen of China, was convicted after trial of charges related to his participation in a conspiracy to steal trade secrets from GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) pertaining to biopharmaceutical products under development from January 2010 to January 2016.

During the offense conduct, Gongda Xue worked as a scientist at the Friedrich Miescher Institute for Biomedical Research (“FMI”) in Switzerland, which is affiliated with Novartis. His sister, Yu Xue, worked as a scientist at GSK in Pennsylvania. Both the defendant and his sister conducted cancer research as part of their employment at these companies.  Their research was sensitive and confidential.  Consequently, GSK and FMI required Yu Xue and Gongda Xue respectively to sign confidentiality agreements as part of their employment.  While the defendant performed basic research for publication in journals, the defendant’s sister performed research relating to GSK’s anti-cancer drugs under development. Evidence presented at trial showed that the defendant knew that GSK’s research could prove incredibly valuable, and that it was proprietary and confidential. 

While working for their respective entities, the defendant and his sister betrayed their employers and shared confidential information for their own personal benefit.  Gongda Xue created Abba Therapeutics AG in Switzerland and Yu Xue and her associates formed Renopharma, Ltd., in China. Both companies intended to develop their own biopharmaceutical anti-cancer products.  Renopharma received direct funding and support from the government of China.  Gongda Xue stole FMI research into anti-cancer products and sent that research to Yu Xue.  Yu Xue, in turn, stole GSK research into anti-cancer products and sent that to Gongda Xue.  Yu Xue also provided hundreds of GSK documents to her associates at Renopharma.  Renopharma then attempted to re-brand GSK products under development as Renopharma products and attempted to sell them for billions of dollars. Renopharma’s own internal projections showed that the company could be worth as much as $10 billion based upon the stolen GSK data. 

Fortunately, in January 2016, the FBI arrested Yu Xue and her Renopharma associates, seized e-mail accounts containing the stolen GSK data, and seized the funds in a Renopharma bank account in order to prevent Renopharma from achieving its goals and monetizing the stolen GSK information.  Gongda Xue was charged in 2018 and extradited from Switzerland to the United States in December 2019. 

Two former GSK employees, Yu Xue and Lucy Xi, have pleaded guilty for their roles in sending GSK trade secrets to Renopharma.  Yu Xue's sister, Tian Xue, pleaded guilty to a money laundering conspiracy for agreeing to launder the substantial ill-gotten gains which Renopharma expected to receive.  One of the directors of Renopharma, Tao Li, also pleaded guilty for his role in conspiring to steal GSK trade secrets.  The other director of Renopharma, Yan Mei, is a fugitive who currently resides in China. 

“This defendant illegally stole trade secrets to benefit companies controlled by himself and his sister, one of which were financed by the Chinese government,” said U.S. Attorney Williams. “The lifeblood of companies like GSK is its intellectual property, and when that property is stolen and transferred to a foreign country, it threatens thousands of American jobs and disincentivizes research and development. Such criminal behavior must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.”

“When a company like GSK spends billions on research and development to bring new drugs to market, the theft of valuable trade secrets poses a significant operational threat,” said Jacqueline Maguire, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Philadelphia Division. “When those secrets are stolen on behalf of a global adversary, it also endangers the security of our nation and the stability of our economy. The FBI will continue to bring all our investigative resources to bear to hold accountable criminals like Xue and his codefendants who steal intellectual property to benefit themselves and the Government of China. Our relationships with private sector partners like GSK are critical to disrupting such costly activity and bringing those responsible to justice.”

The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Robert J. Livermore and J. Jeanette Kang.  Extradition assistance was provided by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs.  The U.S. Attorney would also like to thank GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis for their extraordinary cooperation on this important investigation.

Saturday, January 8, 2022

Chinese National Pleads Guilty To Economic Espionage Conspiracy

The U.S. Justice Department released the below information:

Xiang Haitao, 44, a Chinese national formerly residing in Chesterfield, Missouri, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit economic espionage.

According to court documents, Xiang conspired to steal a trade secret from Monsanto, an international company based in St. Louis, for the purpose of benefitting a foreign government, namely the People’s Republic of China.

“Despite Xiang’s agreements to protect Monsanto’s intellectual property and repeated training on his obligations to do so, Xiang has now admitted that he stole a trade secret from Monsanto, transferred it to a memory card and attempted to take it to the People’s Republic of China for the benefit of Chinese government,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “With his guilty plea, Xiang is now being held accountable for this unlawful conduct.”

“Mr. Xiang used his insider status at a major international company to steal valuable trade secrets for use in his native China,” said U.S. Attorney Sayler Fleming for the Eastern District of Missouri. “We cannot allow U.S. citizens or foreign nationals to hand sensitive business information over to competitors in other countries, and we will continue our vigorous criminal enforcement of economic espionage and trade secret laws. These crimes present a danger to the U.S. economy and jeopardize our nation’s leadership in innovation and our national security.”

“The American worker suffers when adversaries, like the Government of China, steal technology to grow their economies,” said Assistant Director Alan E. Kohler Jr. of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division. “It’s not just military technology developed in secret labs that adversaries want; in this case, it was agricultural technology used by American farmers to improve crop yields. The FBI will continue investigating the theft of technology from American companies because economic security is national security.”

According to court documents, Xiang was employed by Monsanto and its subsidiary, The Climate Corporation, from 2008 to 2017, where he worked as an imaging scientist. Monsanto and The Climate Corporation developed a digital, online farming software platform that was used by farmers to collect, store and visualize critical agricultural field data and increase and improve agricultural productivity for farmers. A critical component to the platform was a proprietary predictive algorithm referred to as the Nutrient Optimizer. Monsanto and The Climate Corporation considered the Nutrient Optimizer a valuable trade secret and their intellectual property.

In June 2017, the day after leaving employment with Monsanto and The Climate Corporation, Xiang attempted to travel to China on a one-way airplane ticket. While he was waiting to board his flight, Federal officials conducted a search of Xiang’s person and baggage. Investigators later determined that one of Xiang’s electronic devices contained copies of the Nutrient Optimizer. Xiang continued on to China where he worked for the Chinese Academy of Science’s Institute of Soil Science. Xiang was arrested when he returned to the United States.

Xiang pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and is scheduled to be sentenced on April 7. He faces a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison, a potential fine of $5 million and a term of supervised release of not more than three years. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Drake for the Eastern District of Missouri, Senior Trial Attorney Heather Schmidt and Trial Attorney Adam Small of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, and Senior Counsel Jeff Pearlman of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section are prosecuting the case.


Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Man Who Worked At Local Research Institute For 10 Years Pleads Guilty To Conspiring To Steal Trade Secrets, Sell Them In China

 The U.S. Justice Department released the below information: 

A former Dublin, Ohio, man pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court today to conspiring to steal exosome-related trade secrets concerning the research, identification and treatment of a range of pediatric medical conditions. 

Yu Zhou, 50, also pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit wire fraud. 

Zhou admitted to conspiring to steal scientific trade secrets related to exosomes and exosome isolation from Nationwide Children’s Hospital’s Research Institute for his own personal financial gain in China. 

“Today’s plea underscores the Department of Justice’s commitment to protecting American research and trade secrets from those incentivized to steal them by Chinese Government programs,” said John C. Demers, Assistant Attorney General for National Security.  “China’s endemic efforts to rob, replicate and replace products that they do not have the ability to develop themselves will not go unchecked, and those who seek to profit from the theft of trade secrets will be held accountable.” 

“The Chinese government has created a large-scale, sophisticated system to steal American ingenuity,” U.S. Attorney David M. DeVillers said. “We hope this conviction demonstrates that we will fight this system.” 

“Zhou and his wife have both accepted responsibility for establishing a company in China to personally profit from the cutting-edge work done at Nationwide Children’s Hospital,” stated FBI Cincinnati Special Agent in Charge Chris Hoffman. “The FBI will continue to work closely with our partners to protect the innovations that have made America a global leader.” 

Zhou and his wife, Li Chen, 47, worked in separate medical research labs at the Research Institute for 10 years each (Zhou from 2007 until 2017 and Chen from 2008 until 2018). They conspired to steal trade secrets related to exosome research from Nationwide Children’s Hospital. 

Exosomes play a key role in the research, identification and treatment of a range of medical conditions, including necrotizing enterocolitis (a condition found in premature babies), liver fibrosis and liver cancer. 

According to his plea agreement, Zhou and Chen conspired to steal and then monetize one of the trade secrets by creating and selling exosome “isolation kits.” Zhou’s research at Nationwide Children’s included a novel isolation method in which exosomes could be isolated from one drop of blood. This method was vital to the research being conducted in Zhou’s lab – because necrotizing enterocolitis is a condition found primarily in premature babies, only small amounts of fluid can safely be taken from them. 

The defendants admitted to starting a company in China to sell the isolation kits. They received benefits from the Chinese government, including the State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs and the National Natural Science Foundation of China. 

Zhou and Chen were arrested in California in July 2019 and their case was unsealed in August 2019 when they appeared in federal court in Columbus. Chen pleaded guilty in July 2020 to conspiring to steal trade secrets and commit wire fraud. 

As part of their pleas, the couple has agreed to forfeit property or gains associated with their crimes.  For Chen, this included approximately $1.4 million, 500,000 shares of common stock of Avalon GloboCare Corp. and 400 shares of common stock of GenExosome Technologies, Inc. The details of Zhou’s forfeiture will be finalized through the sentencing process. 

David M. DeVillers, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio; John C. Demers, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Chris Hoffman, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cincinnati Division, announced the plea entered into today before U.S. District Judge Sarah D. Morrison. Assistant United States Attorneys S. Courter Shimeall, Peter K. Glenn-Applegate, Special Assistant United States Attorney J. Michael Marous and National Security Division Trial Attorney Matthew J. McKenzie, are representing the United States in this case.

Wednesday, November 18, 2020

FBI: The Chinese Threat: Chinese Talent Plans Encourage Trade Secret Theft, Economic Espionage

 The FBI released the below information:

What are Talent Plans? 

Foreign governments sponsor talent recruitment programs, or talent plans, to bring outside knowledge and innovation back to their countries—and sometimes that means stealing trade secrets, breaking export control laws, or violating conflict-of-interest policies to do so.

While various countries use talent plans, the Chinese government is the most prolific sponsor of these programs—and the United States is one of China’s main targets.

The U.S. welcomes international collaboration in academic and scientific research and business development. But American businesses, universities, and laboratories should understand the potential risks and illegal conduct incentivized by Chinese talent plans and take steps to safeguard their trade secrets and intellectual property.

How Chinese Talent Plans Work 

China oversees hundreds of talent plans. All incentivize its members to steal foreign technologies needed to advance China’s national, military, and economic goals.

China recruits science and technology professors, researchers, students, and others—regardless of citizenship or national origin—to apply for talent plans. Individuals with expertise in or access to a technology that China doesn’t have are preferred.

Participants enter into a contract with a Chinese university or company—often affiliated with the Chinese government—that usually requires them to:

  • Subject themselves to Chinese laws
  • Share new technology developments or breakthroughs only with China (they can’t share this information with their U.S employer or host without special authorization from China)
  • Recruit other experts into the program—often their own colleagues

China will let people with existing jobs in the United States participate in talent plans part-time so they can maintain their access to intellectual property, trade secrets, pre-publication data and methods, and U.S. funding for their research.

Talent plan participants are offered multiple financial, personal, and professional benefits in exchange for their efforts.

China’s talent plans have successfully recruited participants around the world to work on key programs like military technologies, nuclear energy, wind tunnel design, and advanced lasers.

Risks and Information for U.S. Businesses, Universities, and Laboratories 

Talent plans can sometimes foster legitimate sharing and collaboration as part of an appropriate business arrangement or research exchange, but this is not the norm.

Instead, talent plans usually involve undisclosed and illegal transfers of information, technology, or intellectual property that are one-way and detrimental to U.S. institutions.

Your students and/or employees could be talent plan participants. Many people who participate in these programs work at prominent U.S. laboratories, businesses, and universities, including places where government research is conducted for sensitive military and scientific projects.

Transparency and disclosure regarding an individual’s participation in a talent plan are essential. This is the only way U.S. institutions can assess the risks to their intellectual property, prevent abuse of the open access offered by the U.S. research environment, and ensure grant-funding programs are fair and equitable. Unfortunately, many participants do not disclose their involvement in these programs.

An individual’s undisclosed participation in a talent plan may:

  • Pose risks to national security because of the participant’s obligation to the Chinese government

  • Result in inappropriate use of taxpayer funds if the participant is awarded a U.S. government grant
  • Harm other researchers and scientists by jeopardizing their professional credibility and their ability to obtain future research funding—and denying them the professional and financial benefits of their efforts—if their work is stolen and transferred to China
  • Result in the recruiting of colleagues by the participant
  • Result in lasting financial damages to your institution due to stolen information or the inability to obtain federal research funding in the future

Even if talent plan participants who steal information are eventually caught and prosecuted, the damage done to your organization by intellectual property theft may be irreversible.

Risks and Information for Chinese Talent Plan Participants 

Although participating in talent plans is not inherently illegal, you may violate U.S. law, especially if you don’t properly disclose your affiliation.

You should familiarize yourself with and abide by disclosure and conflict-of-interest rules required by your U.S. employer and the U.S. government. Transparency and full disclosure of talent plan membership and foreign contracts or agreements are essential for institutions to assess risk.

You risk criminal prosecution when you steal intellectual property or misuse grant funds. Talent plan participants have pleaded guilty or been convicted of offenses including:

  • Export-control law violations
  • Economic espionage and theft of trade secrets
  • Grant and tax fraud


Wednesday, July 8, 2020

FBI Director Wray: The Threat Posed By The Chinese Government And The Chinese Communist Party To The Economic And National Security Of The United States


FBI Director Christopher Wray spoke at the Hudson Institute on July 7, 2020 on China’s Attempt to Influence U.S. Institutions.

Below are his remarks, which the FBI released:
Good morning. I realize it’s challenging, particularly under the current circumstances, to put on an event like this, so I’m grateful to the Hudson Institute for hosting us today.
The greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and to our economic vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our economic security—and by extension, to our national security.
As National Security Advisor O’Brien said in his recent remarks, we cannot close our eyes and ears to what China is doing—and today, in light of the importance of this threat, I will provide more detail on the Chinese threat than the FBI has ever presented in an open forum. This threat is so significant that the attorney general and secretary of state will also be addressing a lot of these issues in the next few weeks. But if you think these issues are just an intelligence issue, or a government problem, or a nuisance largely just for big corporations who can take care of themselves—you could not be more wrong.
It’s the people of the United States who are the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history.
If you are an American adult, it is more likely than not that China has stolen your personal data.
In 2017, the Chinese military conspired to hack Equifax and made off with the sensitive personal information of 150 million Americans—we’re talking nearly half of the American population and most American adults—and as I’ll discuss in a few moments, this was hardly a standalone incident.
Our data isn’t the only thing at stake here—so are our health, our livelihoods, and our security.
We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are related to China. And at this very moment, China is working to compromise American health care organizations, pharmaceutical companies, and academic institutions conducting essential COVID-19 research.
But before I go on, let me be clear: This is not about the Chinese people, and it’s certainly not about Chinese Americans. Every year, the United States welcomes more than 100,000 Chinese students and researchers into this country. For generations, people have journeyed from China to the United States to secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and their families—and our society is better for their contributions. So, when I speak of the threat from China, I mean the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party.
The Chinese Regime and the Scope of Its Ambitions
To understand this threat and how we must act to respond to it, the American people should remember three things.
First: We need to be clear-eyed about the scope of the Chinese government’s ambition. China—the Chinese Communist Party—believes it is in a generational fight to surpass our country in economic and technological leadership.
That is sobering enough. But it’s waging this fight not through legitimate innovation, not through fair and lawful competition, and not by giving their citizens the freedom of thought and speech and creativity that we treasure here in the United States. Instead, China is engaged in a whole-of-state effort to become the world’s only superpower by any means necessary.
A Diverse and Multi-Layered Approach
The second thing the American people need to understand is that China uses a diverse range of sophisticated techniques—everything from cyber intrusions to corrupting trusted insiders. They’ve even engaged in outright physical theft. And they’ve pioneered an expansive approach to stealing innovation through a wide range of actors—including not just Chinese intelligence services but state-owned enterprises, ostensibly private companies, certain kinds of graduate students and researchers, and a whole variety of other actors working on their behalf.
Economic Espionage
To achieve its goals and surpass America, China recognizes it needs to make leaps in cutting-edge technologies. But the sad fact is that instead of engaging in the hard slog of innovation, China often steals American intellectual property and then uses it to compete against the very American companies it victimized—in effect, cheating twice over. They’re targeting research on everything from military equipment to wind turbines to rice and corn seeds.
Through its talent recruitment programs, like the so-called Thousand Talents Program, the Chinese government tries to entice scientists to secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China—even if that means stealing proprietary information or violating our export controls and conflict-of-interest rules.
Take the case of scientist Hongjin Tan, for example, a Chinese national and American lawful permanent resident. He applied to China’s Thousand Talents Program and stole more than $1 billion—that’s with a “b”—worth of trade secrets from his former employer, an Oklahoma-based petroleum company, and got caught. A few months ago, he was convicted and sent to prison.
Or there’s the case of Shan Shi, a Texas-based scientist, also sentenced to prison earlier this year. Shi stole trade secrets regarding syntactic foam, an important naval technology used in submarines. Shi, too, had applied to China’s Thousand Talents Program, and specifically pledged to “digest” and “absorb” the relevant technology in the United States. He did this on behalf of Chinese state-owned enterprises, which ultimately planned to put the American company out of business and take over the market.
In one of the more galling and egregious aspects of the scheme, the conspirators actually patented in China the very manufacturing process they’d stolen, and then offered their victim American company a joint venture using its own stolen technology. We’re talking about an American company that spent years and millions of dollars developing that technology, and China couldn’t replicate it—so, instead, it paid to have it stolen.
And just two weeks ago, Hao Zhang was convicted of economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and conspiracy for stealing proprietary information about wireless devices from two U.S. companies. One of those companies had spent over 20 years developing the technology Zhang stole.
These cases were among more than a thousand investigations the FBI has into China’s actual and attempted theft of American technology—which is to say nothing of over a thousand more ongoing counterintelligence investigations of other kinds related to China. We’re conducting these kinds of investigations in all 56 of our field offices. And over the past decade, we’ve seen economic espionage cases with a link to China increase by approximately 1,300 percent.
The stakes could not be higher, and the potential economic harm to American businesses and the economy as a whole almost defies calculation.

Clandestine Efforts
As National Security Advisor O’Brien discussed in his June remarks, the Chinese government is also making liberal use of hacking to steal our corporate and personal data—and they’re using both military and non-state hackers to do it. The Equifax intrusion I mentioned just a few moments ago, which led to the indictment of Chinese military personnel, was hardly the only time China stole the sensitive personal information of huge numbers of the American public.
For example, did any of you have health insurance through Anthem or one of its associated insurers? In 2015, China’s hackers stole the personal data of 80 million of that company’s current and former customers.
Or maybe you’re a federal employee—or you used to be one, or you applied for a government job once, or a family member or roommate did. Well, in 2014, China’s hackers stole more than 21 million records from OPM, the federal government’s Office of Personnel Management.
Why are they doing this? First, China has made becoming an artificial intelligence world leader a priority, and these kinds of thefts feed right into China’s development of artificial intelligence tools.
Compounding the threat, the data China stole is of obvious value as they attempt to identify people for secret intelligence gathering. On that front, China is using social media platforms—the same ones Americans use to stay connected or find jobs—to identify people with access to our government’s sensitive information and then target those people to try to steal it.
Just to pick one example, a Chinese intelligence officer posing as a headhunter on a popular social media platform recently offered an American citizen a sizeable sum of money in exchange for so-called “consulting” services. That sounds benign enough until you realize those “consulting” services were related to sensitive information the American target had access to as a U.S. military intelligence specialist.
Now that particular tale has a happy ending: The American citizen did the right thing and reported the suspicious contact, and the FBI, working together with our armed forces, took it from there. I wish I could say that all such incidents ended that way.
Threats to Academia
It’s a troublingly similar story in academia.
Through talent recruitment programs like the Thousand Talents Program I mentioned just a few moments ago, China pays scientists at American universities to secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China—including valuable, federally funded research. To put it bluntly, this means American taxpayers are effectively footing the bill for China’s own technological development. China then leverages its ill-gotten gains to undercut U.S. research institutions and companies, blunting our nation’s advancement and costing American jobs. And we are seeing more and more of these cases.
In May alone, we arrested both Qing Wang, a former researcher with the Cleveland Clinic who worked on molecular medicine and the genetics of cardiovascular disease, and Simon Saw-Teong Ang, a University of Arkansas scientist doing research for NASA. Both of these guys were allegedly committing fraud by concealing their participation in Chinese talent recruitment programs while accepting millions of dollars in American federal grant funding.
That same month, former Emory University professor Xiao-Jiang Li pled guilty to filing a false tax return for failing to report the income he’d received through China’s Thousand Talents Program. Our investigation found that while Li was researching Huntington’s disease at Emory, he was also pocketing half a million unreported dollars from China.
In a similar vein, Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard’s Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, was indicted just last month for making false statements to federal authorities about his Thousand Talents participation. The United States has alleged that Lieber concealed from both Harvard and the NIH his position as a strategic scientist at a Chinese university—and the fact that the Chinese government was paying him, through the Wuhan Institute of Technology, a $50,000 monthly stipend, more than $150,000 in living expenses, and more than $1.5 million to establish a laboratory back in China.
Malign Foreign Influence
There’s more. Another tool China and the Chinese Communist Party use to manipulate Americans is what we call malign foreign influence.
Now, traditional foreign influence is a normal, legal diplomatic activity typically conducted through diplomatic channels. But malign foreign influence efforts are subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive attempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our country’s public discourse, and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values.
China is engaged in a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign, and its methods include bribery, blackmail, and covert deals. Chinese diplomats also use both open, naked economic pressure and seemingly independent middlemen to push China’s preferences on American officials.
Just take one all-too-common illustration: Let’s say China gets wind that some American official is planning to travel to Taiwan—think a governor, a state senator, a member of Congress. China does not want that to happen, because that travel might appear to legitimize Taiwanese independence from China—and legitimizing Taiwan would, of course, be contrary to China’s “One China” policy.
So what does China do? Well, China has leverage over the American official’s constituents—American companies, academics, and members of the media all have legitimate and understandable reasons to want access to Chinese partners and markets. And because of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party, China has immense power over those same partners and markets. So, China will sometimes start by trying to influence the American official overtly and directly. China might openly warn that if the American official goes ahead and takes that trip to Taiwan, China will take it out on a company from that official’s home state by withholding the company’s license to manufacture in China. That could be economically ruinous for the company, would directly pressure the American official to alter his travel plans, and the official would know that China was trying to influence him.
That would be bad enough. But the Chinese Communist Party often doesn’t stop there; it can’t stop there if it wants to stay in power—so it uses its leverage even more perniciously. If China’s more direct, overt influence campaign doesn’t do the trick, they sometimes turn to indirect, covert, deceptive influence efforts.
To continue with the illustration of the American official with travel plans that the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t like, China will work relentlessly to identify the people closest to that official—the people that official trusts most. China will then work to influence those people to act on China’s behalf as middlemen to influence the official. The co-opted middlemen may then whisper in the official’s ear and try to sway the official’s travel plans or public positions on Chinese policy. These intermediaries, of course, aren’t telling the American official that they’re Chinese Communist Party pawns—and worse still, some of these intermediaries may not even realize they’re being used as pawns, because they, too, have been deceived.
Ultimately, China doesn’t hesitate to use smoke, mirrors, and misdirection to influence Americans.
Similarly, China often pushes academics and journalists to self-censor if they want to travel into China. And we’ve seen the Chinese Communist Party pressure American media and sporting giants to ignore or suppress criticism of China’s ambitions regarding Hong Kong or Taiwan. This kind of thing is happening over and over, across the United States.
And I will note that the pandemic has unfortunately not stopped any of this—in fact, we have heard from federal, state, and even local officials that Chinese diplomats are aggressively urging support for China’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis. Yes, this is happening at both the federal and state levels. Not that long ago, we had a state senator who was recently even asked to introduce a resolution supporting China’s response to the pandemic.
The punchline is this: All of these seemingly inconsequential pressures add up to a policymaking environment in which Americans find themselves held over a barrel by the Chinese Communist Party.
Threats to the Rule of Law
All the while, China’s government and Communist Party have brazenly violated well-settled norms and the rule of law.
Since 2014, Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has spearheaded a program known as “Fox Hunt.” Now, China describes Fox Hunt as some kind of international anti-corruption campaign—it is not. Instead, Fox Hunt is a sweeping bid by General Secretary Xi to target Chinese nationals whom he sees as threats and who live outside China, across the world. We’re talking about political rivals, dissidents, and critics seeking to expose China’s extensive human rights violations.
Hundreds of the Fox Hunt victims that they target live right here in the United States, and many are American citizens or green card holders. The Chinese government wants to force them to return to China, and China’s tactics to accomplish that are shocking. For example, when it couldn’t locate one Fox Hunt target, the Chinese government sent an emissary to visit the target’s family here in the United States. The message they said to pass on? The target had two options: return to China promptly, or commit suicide. And what happens when Fox Hunt targets refuse to return to China? In the past, their family members both here in the United States and in China have been threatened and coerced, and those back in China have even been arrested for leverage.
I’ll take this opportunity to note that if you believe the Chinese government is targeting you—that you’re a potential Fox Hunt victim—please reach out to your local FBI field office.
Exploiting Our Openness
Understanding how a nation could engage in these tactics brings me to the third thing the American people need to remember: that China has a fundamentally different system than ours—and it’s doing all it can to exploit the openness of ours while taking advantage of its own closed system.
Many of the distinctions that mean a lot here in the United States are blurry or almost nonexistent in China—I'm talking about distinctions between the government and the Chinese Communist Party, between the civilian and military sectors, and between the state and the “private” sector.
For one thing, an awful lot of large Chinese businesses are state-owned enterprises—literally owned by the government, and thus the Party. And even if they aren’t, China’s laws allow its government to compel any Chinese company to provide any information it requests—including American citizens’ data.
On top of that, Chinese companies of any real size are legally required to have Communist Party “cells” inside them to keep them in line. Even more alarmingly, Communist Party cells have reportedly been established in some American companies operating in China as a cost of doing business there.
These kinds of features should give U.S. companies pause when they consider working with Chinese corporations like Huawei—and should give all Americans pause, too, when relying on such a company’s devices and networks. As the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Huawei has broad access to much that American companies do in China. It’s also been charged in the United States with racketeering conspiracy and has, as alleged in the indictment, repeatedly stolen intellectual property from U.S. companies, obstructed justice, and lied to the U.S. government and its commercial partners, including banks.
The allegations are clear: Huawei is a serial intellectual property thief, with a pattern and practice of disregarding both the rule of law and the rights of its victims. I have to tell you, it certainly caught my attention to read a recent article describing the words of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, about the company’s mindset. At a Huawei research and development center, he reportedly told employees that to ensure the company’s survival, they need to—and I quote—“surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.” He’s also reportedly told employees that Huawei has entered, to quote, “a state of war.” I certainly hope he couldn’t have meant that literally, but it’s hardly an encouraging tone, given the company’s repeated criminal behavior.
In our modern world, there is perhaps no more ominous prospect than a hostile foreign government’s ability to compromise our country’s infrastructure and devices. If Chinese companies like Huawei are given unfettered access to our telecommunications infrastructure, they could collect any of your information that traverses their devices or networks. Worse still: They’d have no choice but to hand it over to the Chinese government if asked—the privacy and due process protections that are sacrosanct in the United States are simply non-existent in China.
Responding Effectively to the Threat
The Chinese government is engaged in a broad, diverse campaign of theft and malign influence, and it can execute that campaign with authoritarian efficiency. They’re calculating. They’re persistent. They’re patient. And they’re not subject to the righteous constraints of an open, democratic society or the rule of law.
China, as led by the Chinese Communist Party, is going to continue to try to misappropriate our ideas, influence our policymakers, manipulate our public opinion, and steal our data. They will use an all-tools and all-sectors approach—and that demands our own all-tools and all-sectors approach in response.
Our folks at the FBI are working their tails off every day to protect our nation’s companies, our universities, our computer networks, and our ideas and innovation. To do that, we’re using a broad set of techniques—from our traditional law enforcement authorities to our intelligence capabilities.
And I will briefly note that we’re having real success. With the help of our many foreign partners, we’ve arrested targets all over the globe. Our investigations and the resulting prosecutions have exposed the tradecraft and techniques the Chinese use, raising awareness of the threat and our industries’ defenses. They also show our resolve and our ability to attribute these crimes to those responsible. It’s one thing to make assertions—but in our justice system, when a person, or a corporation, is investigated and then charged with a crime, we have to prove the truth of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. The truth matters—and so, these criminal indictments matter. And we’ve seen how our criminal indictments have rallied other nations to our cause—which is crucial to persuading the Chinese government to change its behavior.
We’re also working more closely than ever with partner agencies here in the U.S. and our partners abroad. We can’t do it on our own; we need a whole-of-society response. That’s why we in the intelligence and law enforcement communities are working harder than ever to give companies, universities, and the American people themselves the information they need to make their own informed decisions and protect their most valuable assets.
Confronting this threat effectively does not mean we shouldn’t do business with the Chinese. It does not mean we shouldn’t host Chinese visitors. It does not mean we shouldn’t welcome Chinese students or coexist with China on the world stage. But it does mean that when China violates our criminal laws and international norms, we are not going to tolerate it, much less enable it. The FBI and our partners throughout the U.S. government will hold China accountable and protect our nation’s innovation, ideas, and way of life—with the help and vigilance of the American people.
Thank you for having me here today.

Friday, May 29, 2020

FBI: Billion-Dollar Secrets Stolen - Scientist Sentenced For Theft of Trade Secrets


The FBI released the below information:
When scientist Hongjin Tan resigned from the Oklahoma petroleum company he’d worked at for 18 months, he told his superiors that he planned to return to China to care for his aging parents. He also reported that he hadn’t arranged his next job, so the company agreed to let him to stay in his role until his departure date in December 2018.
But Tan told a colleague a different story over dinner.
That conversation prompted Tan’s employer to ask him to leave the firm immediately—and then his employer made a call to the FBI tip line to report a possible crime. The resulting investigation led to Tan’s guilty plea and 24-month prison sentence for stealing proprietary information that belonged to his company.
Tan’s theft of a trade secret—one worth an estimated $1 billion—is an example of what the FBI says is a systematic campaign by the Chinese government to gain economic advantage by stealing the innovative work of U.S. companies and facilities.
Tan had lived in the United States since 2012 and was a legal permanent resident. He earned his Ph.D. at an American university and had worked for a number of firms in California before making his way to the energy company in Oklahoma.
One of that firm’s most innovative products was a battery technology that employees had spent decades researching and developing. The technology also has a secondary, and perhaps even more valuable, use in melting metal.
When Tan revealed to his colleague that he actually did have a job waiting for him in China with Xiamen Tungsten, Tan’s dinner companion reported the conversation to his supervisor—who grew alarmed after researching the company. Xiamen Tungsten is a Chinese firm that smelts, processes, and distributes metal products and also supplies battery materials.
With this new information, the company immediately dismissed Tan from his responsibilities. Because they were now concerned about his motives, the company also began to look back at the documents and systems he had accessed while employed there.
While this review was going on, Tan called his supervisor to tell them he had a thumb drive with company documents on it. “He said he was hoping to read them to continue his research work,” said FBI Special Agent Jeremy Sykes, who worked on the case out of our Oklahoma City Field Office. “The company told him he needed to return the thumb drive.”
The company had already found Tan had been accessing sensitive documents that dealt with this innovative technology but did not directly relate to Tan’s work for the firm.
FBI agents said he began accessing these sensitive files around the time he applied to China’s Thousand Talents Program. U.S. intelligence agencies have found that, through this program, China provides financial incentives and other privileges to participants who are willing to send back the research and technology knowledge they can access while working in the United States. Tan also called up the documents around the times he made trips to China, and he accessed them for a final time on the day before he resigned.
“When he brought back the thumb drive, the firm looked at the slack space on the drive and found several files had been erased,” said Sykes. “The deleted files were the files the company was most concerned about.” 
The company worked closely with the FBI to help them investigate the case and identify the company files Tan had stored at his home. Gaining this information allowed agents to get an arrest warrant for Tan.
“If you got your hands on this information, you would be decades ahead of where you would have started out on this technology,” said Special Agent Rebecca Day of FBI Oklahoma City’s Tulsa Resident Agency. “We won’t tolerate people who come into the United States to steal for the betterment of a foreign government or foreign company.”
At a recent conference in Boston, FBI Director Christopher Wray addressed this disquieting threat: “We see Chinese companies stealing American intellectual property to avoid the hard slog of innovation and then using it to compete against the very American companies they victimized—in effect, cheating twice over.”
FBI Oklahoma City Special Agent Quincy Barnett said that there are a number of things companies can do to protect their products, research, and innovations, and that the FBI is eager to develop relationships with firms. “If we reach out,” he said, “it’s not a negative. We may have identified opportunities to engage.”
The Bureau can provide briefings to executives and employees on insider threats, share precautions workers should take when they travel to certain countries, help IT staff assess how to compartmentalize system and file access, and remind firms to put nondisclosure agreements in place to ensure employees agree not to share certain information.
In this case, the firm’s willingness to report the suspected crime so quickly made the difference in being able to hold Tan accountable. “We were on the phone with the company on December 13,” Sykes said. “We knew Tan was flying out of the country on December 29.”
Barnett said the FBI has seen that some companies resist reporting because they fear it will harm their stock price or be seen as a negative among shareholders.
“Companies can bring this information to the FBI, and we can work through those fears and hesitations,” said Barnett. “We are trying to send a message that this won’t be tolerated, but we have to find out about it first.”
The case against Tan not only resulted in two years of prison time but also, with support from Homeland Security Investigations, the loss of his residency status. Tan will be deported when he is released, which is a strong indicator of just how seriously the U.S. is taking these types of criminal violations.